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Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2 — arXiv:2609.22652

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22652
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-09T06:59:10.950Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 17c4c9efb55fab32587e9e4f9a27bfd0c9bcbcfbaf398228873a9534fcefdd30
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4ddaaa75ca5d

How to cite

Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2 — arXiv:2609.22652 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22652 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4ddaaa75ca5d (Metraipolis archive dc_4ddaaa75ca5d, sha256 17c4c9efb55fab32587e9e4f9a27bfd0c9bcbcfbaf398228873a9534fcefdd30)

BibTeX

@misc{dc4ddaaa75ca5d,
  title = {Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2 — arXiv:2609.22652},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22652},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4ddaaa75ca5d; sha256 17c4c9efb55fab32587e9e4f9a27bfd0c9bcbcfbaf398228873a9534fcefdd30},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22652. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the design of priority pricing systems with heterogeneous agents in environments in which improving quality for some agents reduces the average quality that can be provided. Contrary to the equity-efficiency tradeoff emphasized in public debates, we show that under economically natural conditions priority pricing can Pareto-improve on an equal-allocation benchmark. Three priority tiers suffice for such an improvement, combining higher quality for a fee, lower quality with compensation, and an intermediate tier at the benchmark quality; two tiers are never enough. Our results provide a framework for overcoming equity-efficiency tensions in applications such as lane pricing, waiting-line design, public provision, and insurance.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in econ.GN).
Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22652 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T06:52:42.694Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).