Metraipolis › archive › dc_4d09eceb8f73
Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks — arXiv:2609.10576
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T05:45:10.748Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
884bcc1e453bac56b592fe0b43f3bd103330b842128217a7d88a77579113655c- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4d09eceb8f73
How to cite
Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks — arXiv:2609.10576 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4d09eceb8f73 (Metraipolis archive dc_4d09eceb8f73, sha256 884bcc1e453bac56b592fe0b43f3bd103330b842128217a7d88a77579113655c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4d09eceb8f73,
title = {Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks — arXiv:2609.10576},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4d09eceb8f73; sha256 884bcc1e453bac56b592fe0b43f3bd103330b842128217a7d88a77579113655c},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We consider a fully connected gossip network of $n$ nodes that track a binary continuous-time Markov source through a strategic sender transmitting updates under a communication budget at a rate that depends on the source state. The receivers exchange packets through gossip and decide whether to follow the sender. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and analyze it through a stochastic hybrid systems (SHS) framework. We prove that the sender's budget constraint binds at every interior optimum, reducing its problem to a one-dimensional search on the budget line. When the sender pushes its preferred state at the higher rate, the receivers gossip at the highest available rate. Gossip has no direction of its own and works against the asymmetry in the sender's policy rather than reinforcing it. We prove that an optimistic Stackelberg equilibrium exists, and that it is unique and explicitly characterized whenever a policy on the strategic half of that line is feasible at the gossip cap. Monte Carlo simulations agree with the analytical recursion. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Information Theory (cs.IT); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI); Social and Information Networks (cs.SI); Systems and Control (eess.SY). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T05:29:38.349Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).