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GPUThor: Amplifying Rowhammer Attacks via Non-Uniform Patterns to Exploit ECC-Protected GPUs — arXiv:2609.16546

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16546
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T19:33:09.717Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
3d3d69cf53a5b3b8eb4e6d1b8caff0b18b10fdadcb015cd1766ec32dd1845336
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4c48b2ef392e

How to cite

GPUThor: Amplifying Rowhammer Attacks via Non-Uniform Patterns to Exploit ECC-Protected GPUs — arXiv:2609.16546 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16546 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4c48b2ef392e (Metraipolis archive dc_4c48b2ef392e, sha256 3d3d69cf53a5b3b8eb4e6d1b8caff0b18b10fdadcb015cd1766ec32dd1845336)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4c48b2ef392e,
  title = {GPUThor: Amplifying Rowhammer Attacks via Non-Uniform Patterns to Exploit ECC-Protected GPUs — arXiv:2609.16546},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16546},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4c48b2ef392e; sha256 3d3d69cf53a5b3b8eb4e6d1b8caff0b18b10fdadcb015cd1766ec32dd1845336},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16546. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

GDDR memory in GPUs is vulnerable to Rowhammer attacks, where rapid memory accesses induce bit flips in adjacent cells, enabling data tampering and privilege escalation. However, prior GPU Rowhammer attacks trigger only tens to hundreds of bit flips, orders of magnitude fewer than CPU attacks, severely limiting their practical impact. This gap stems from the reliance of existing GPU Rowhammer attacks on uniform hammering patterns that activate aggressor and decoy rows equally, which results in low hammering intensity for aggressor rows. We present GPUThor, a high-intensity Rowhammer attack on NVIDIA GPUs leveraging non-uniform hammering. GPUThor reverse engineers GPU memory-access coalescing behavior to enable non-uniform hammering patterns on GPUs, that activate aggressor rows more intensely than decoy rows. Additionally, by identifying refresh instances when in-DRAM mitigations are applied, it constructs longer attack patterns that escape mitigation across refresh intervals, further increasing hammering intensity. Together, these techniques yield 500X to 23,500X more bit flips than prior GPU Rowhammer attacks, across several NVIDIA GPUs (A4000, A4500, A5000, A6000), reaching bit flip rates close to state-of-the-art CPU Rowhammer attacks. GPUThor also enables the first Rowhammer exploits on ECC-protected GPUs, inducing uncorrectable double and triple bit flips, making denial-of-service and privilege-escalation attacks practical even on GPUs with ECC enabled.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-16 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16546 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T18:42:42.616Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-16?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).