Metraipolis › archive › dc_4bf3fdec13ac
AI Agent Economics: Can Autonomous Economic Behavior Emerge among AI Agents under Minimal External Conditions? — arXiv:2608.03076
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03076
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-31T12:15:33.879Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
96b4a0dc1dd650c0d400daed915c8080554c32c05e9c25d09a27416bdbcefbf0- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4bf3fdec13ac
How to cite
AI Agent Economics: Can Autonomous Economic Behavior Emerge among AI Agents under Minimal External Conditions? — arXiv:2608.03076 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03076 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4bf3fdec13ac (Metraipolis archive dc_4bf3fdec13ac, sha256 96b4a0dc1dd650c0d400daed915c8080554c32c05e9c25d09a27416bdbcefbf0)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4bf3fdec13ac,
title = {AI Agent Economics: Can Autonomous Economic Behavior Emerge among AI Agents under Minimal External Conditions? — arXiv:2608.03076},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03076},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4bf3fdec13ac; sha256 96b4a0dc1dd650c0d400daed915c8080554c32c05e9c25d09a27416bdbcefbf0},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03076. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Multi-agent studies commonly place AI agents in predefined games, markets, or roles, making it difficult to distinguish endogenous economic organization from behavior inherited from the scenario. We ask whether economic relations emerge when agents receive executable mechanisms for work, transfer, elections, and allocation but no prescribed social or economic strategy. We define AI Agent Economics as systems of production, allocation, consumption, exchange, and institutions that alter agents' future feasible actions. We develop a two-stage framework comprising a no-production boundary test and 24 independent six-agent worlds across GPT and DeepSeek. Without productive tasks, agents communicate and govern resource provision but show no substantive inter-agent transfer activity. With verified work and scarce task access, transfers, loans, access promises, vote-for-access exchanges, and allocation strategies emerge. Holding the election interface fixed, executable allocation authority increases differentiation while reducing failed allocation and prolonged exclusion. When energy becomes symbolic, continuation support disappears, yet competition over task access persists. These findings show that organization follows executable rights and resource consequences rather than role labels or prompt language, and motivate governance audits of the mechanisms that actually constrain agents' future actions. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-05 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03076 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-31T12:05:52.750Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-05?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).