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One AI Signal, Many Human Judgments: A Bayesian Cascade Analysis of AI-based Credibility Indicators in Online Information Spread — arXiv:2608.30311

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30311
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T07:52:34.954Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
62d59fb8f6b041b6ba6d6ce47a1f3e77cbd41d25fbc728f92bddc068137ce41a
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4badcd2dd4c4

How to cite

One AI Signal, Many Human Judgments: A Bayesian Cascade Analysis of AI-based Credibility Indicators in Online Information Spread — arXiv:2608.30311 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30311 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4badcd2dd4c4 (Metraipolis archive dc_4badcd2dd4c4, sha256 62d59fb8f6b041b6ba6d6ce47a1f3e77cbd41d25fbc728f92bddc068137ce41a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4badcd2dd4c4,
  title = {One AI Signal, Many Human Judgments: A Bayesian Cascade Analysis of AI-based Credibility Indicators in Online Information Spread — arXiv:2608.30311},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30311},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4badcd2dd4c4; sha256 62d59fb8f6b041b6ba6d6ce47a1f3e77cbd41d25fbc728f92bddc068137ce41a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30311. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Social media platforms increasingly use AI-based credibility indicators to help users judge misinformation. Unlike individual human-AI decision-making, these indicators are embedded in information spread: users see both an AI prediction and earlier judgments shaped by the same AI, and their own judgments may then enter the public history. Yet how to analytically characterize this process remains under-explored. We therefore introduce a social-learning lens for this setting by extending the classical Bayesian cascade model with the AI indicator as a shared public signal. The resulting Gateway condition compares the evidence from the AI prediction with users' private impressions. Through this view, we show that AI changes what public history means. Crowd agreement may reflect accumulated independent human evidence, or repeated dependence on the same AI prediction. This creates a preservation-correction trade-off: stronger reliance on AI can preserve correct predictions, but can also lock in incorrect ones by blocking corrective private impressions. We calibrate the model using human-subject data on news veracity judgments. Although the AI outperforms human users, the average user weights it below her own impression but above several peer judgments, while individual users vary from discounting the AI to relying on it enough to cascade. Simulations show that over-reliance on a weak AI is especially harmful, and that diversifying AI signals across users can better keep the crowd informative. We conclude with implications for understanding human-AI interaction in information spread and designing misinformation interventions.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Social and Information Networks (cs.SI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30311 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T07:28:26.853Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).