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A2ABreak: Systematic Security Analysis of the A2A Protocol — arXiv:2609.10871
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10871
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T05:46:20.629Z
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A2ABreak: Systematic Security Analysis of the A2A Protocol — arXiv:2609.10871 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10871 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4b9b397666db (Metraipolis archive dc_4b9b397666db, sha256 6c8b0c0cde55e24c971f73371fc8793133b5e99300849e46209095236b31696c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4b9b397666db,
title = {A2ABreak: Systematic Security Analysis of the A2A Protocol — arXiv:2609.10871},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10871},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4b9b397666db; sha256 6c8b0c0cde55e24c971f73371fc8793133b5e99300849e46209095236b31696c},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10871. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol, now governed by the Linux Foundation, is an open standard that enables autonomous AI agents to discover, authenticate with, and delegate tasks to one another across organizational boundaries. Designed to complement the Model Context Protocol (MCP) for tool integration, A2A is rapidly emerging as the horizontal communication layer of the multi-agent ecosystem. Yet the protocol's security has received no systematic analysis. This paper presents A2ABreak, the first rigorous systematic security analysis of the A2A protocol. We introduce a novel framework that utilizes an LLM-assisted extraction of a verified finite-state machine directly from the natural-language specification, producing a unified model of 37 states and 76 transitions from 929 formalized statements, and then systematically reasons over this model to discover protocol-level vulnerabilities through adversarial verification, under a full-compliance assumption. Our analysis uncovers 11 new vulnerabilities, each exploitable by a specification-compliant adversary without requiring any implementation flaw. Among the findings are cross-client context injection through unprotected context identifiers, credential harvesting via multi-hop identity loss in delegation chains, and data exfiltration through rogue agents advertising unattested capability claims. A2ABreak achieves 73.3% precision and 84.6% F1 against manual expert review, while a zero-shot LLM baseline operating over the same specification produces zero confirmed findings, demonstrating that explicit formal grounding is essential for sound protocol security analysis. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Software Engineering (cs.SE). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10871 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T05:30:39.377Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).