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Generalized Prophet Inequalities for Online Auctions — arXiv:2609.39887
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39887
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T13:16:33.159Z
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Generalized Prophet Inequalities for Online Auctions — arXiv:2609.39887 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39887 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_49f663cff926 (Metraipolis archive dc_49f663cff926, sha256 5177cfbe47fb6e038ff5bfce77db3e946eed1b5976bb840f388e218f437d22e8)
BibTeX
@misc{dc49f663cff926,
title = {Generalized Prophet Inequalities for Online Auctions — arXiv:2609.39887},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39887},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_49f663cff926; sha256 5177cfbe47fb6e038ff5bfce77db3e946eed1b5976bb840f388e218f437d22e8},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39887. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Prophet Inequalities for online auctions, as many classical auction settings, traditionally consider agents who strive to maximize quasi-linear utility, i.e. their obtained value minus the price paid. This simplified view of the agents' objectives does not capture real-world settings where agents are almost always constrained by budgets, and can have different objectives altogether (e.g., very prominently, value maximizers in autobidding). We generalize classic prophet inequality auction settings to accommodate unknown, varying types of agent objectives and budgets, modeling them as stochastic input similar to the traditional valuation distributions. In this new model, we analyze (anonymous) posted-price mechanisms, one main category of which are the balanced prices central to many auction results in the prophet inequality model. We demonstrate both the resilience and limits of balanced price mechanisms for generalized prophet inequalities with stochastic agent objectives, budgets and valuations: our generalization of the balanced prices framework incorporates budget constraints and mixed objectives. We show constant competitive ratios for some the most central settings, spanning all the way up to agents with subadditive valuation functions. On the way, we establish trade-offs between competitive ratio and agents' price-sensitivity, and give a general reduction from the budgeted setting to budget-free value maximizers. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-01 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39887 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T12:48:01.881Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-10-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).