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Large player classes and approximately weighted voting — arXiv:2610.08968

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.08968
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T11:35:03.431Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
6f6efb26113e2ebce3f3bb18d39a8fef02a5adb9894480931562859c63c1f9df
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_49b2384978cc

How to cite

Large player classes and approximately weighted voting — arXiv:2610.08968 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.08968 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_49b2384978cc (Metraipolis archive dc_49b2384978cc, sha256 6f6efb26113e2ebce3f3bb18d39a8fef02a5adb9894480931562859c63c1f9df)
BibTeX
@misc{dc49b2384978cc,
  title = {Large player classes and approximately weighted voting — arXiv:2610.08968},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.08968},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_49b2384978cc; sha256 6f6efb26113e2ebce3f3bb18d39a8fef02a5adb9894480931562859c63c1f9df},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.08968. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

It is known that completeness of the coalitional ($C$-)desirability relation in a simple game does not imply the existence of a weighted-majority representation. We show that weightedness is implied in an approximate sense. Call an $n$-player simple game $\varepsilon$-weighted if, for some weight vector in the $(n-1)$-simplex, any losing coalition weight exceeds any winning coalition weight by at most $\varepsilon$; let $\varepsilon^{\ast}$ be the smallest such $\varepsilon$. We establish an upper bound on $\varepsilon^{\ast}$ in a general $C$-complete game, and deduce that, if all classes of equally desirable players become large asymptotically but the number of classes is bounded, then $\varepsilon^{\ast}=O(1/n_{\min})$ for the minimal player class size $n_{\min}$, and the bound is tight. Importantly, the minimal attainable fraction $\delta$ of coalitions mislabeled by a weighting rule also tends to $0$ when $n_{\min}\rightarrow\infty$ and the number of player classes is bounded, with $\delta=O(1/\sqrt{n_{\min}})$.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.08968 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T10:34:51.753Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).