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Certified Learning and Equilibrium Implementation under Opaque Partial Commitment — arXiv:2608.20766

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20766
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T11:27:59.407Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
807290053f7b696581621fdf518cd2b006defe3db3de48f6bcaee4f35baaf24a
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4875844385bc

How to cite

Certified Learning and Equilibrium Implementation under Opaque Partial Commitment — arXiv:2608.20766 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20766 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4875844385bc (Metraipolis archive dc_4875844385bc, sha256 807290053f7b696581621fdf518cd2b006defe3db3de48f6bcaee4f35baaf24a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4875844385bc,
  title = {Certified Learning and Equilibrium Implementation under Opaque Partial Commitment — arXiv:2608.20766},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20766},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4875844385bc; sha256 807290053f7b696581621fdf518cd2b006defe3db3de48f6bcaee4f35baaf24a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20766. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

As an extension of existing Bayesian persuasion framework with inadequate message mechanism, we study direct recommendation when a sender is bound by an installed information policy only with probability $\rho$, the realization of binding is hidden, and the receiver does not observe the persistent structural environment. The receiver first sees a payoff-neutral, nonmanipulable calibration sample and then faces a fresh, non-certified deployment interaction. In common, the calibration law identifies only the receiver-facing reduced form, not the latent binding and discretionary kernels. We characterize type-wise $\rho$-implementability, construct the receiver's posterior over the full deployment node, and prove a static direct-following implementation theorem. After every calibration history that passes a posterior-predictive obedience test, the deployment assessment is an exact perfect Bayesian equilibrium: Bayes consistency, receiver sequential rationality, sender sequential rationality, and off-path completion are all verified. Under finite-type separation, common recommendation support, and a positive obedience margin, the test activates such an equilibrium with high probability. Our results keep statistical failure probability distinct from equilibrium approximation. Finally, we embed the original robust value frontier, support-wise linear-programming algorithm, and binary-action fractional-knapsack specialization into this implementation framework

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-24 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20766 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T11:27:40.282Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).