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Towards Model-based Run-time Cybersecurity: On Control-Flow Anomaly Detection, Attack Identification, and Hardware Monitoring — arXiv:2608.11802
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11802
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T05:16:13.460Z
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Towards Model-based Run-time Cybersecurity: On Control-Flow Anomaly Detection, Attack Identification, and Hardware Monitoring — arXiv:2608.11802 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11802 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_46df320f1b8a (Metraipolis archive dc_46df320f1b8a, sha256 a968ca31ae9e7d039cef2657b17f8d67d4f10816010d2e6ec687cd9b5ab6ed72)
BibTeX
@misc{dc46df320f1b8a,
title = {Towards Model-based Run-time Cybersecurity: On Control-Flow Anomaly Detection, Attack Identification, and Hardware Monitoring — arXiv:2608.11802},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11802},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_46df320f1b8a; sha256 a968ca31ae9e7d039cef2657b17f8d67d4f10816010d2e6ec687cd9b5ab6ed72},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11802. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Methods to increase the resilience of systems to cyber-attacks become increasingly important. Control-flow monitoring provides a principled basis to ensure integrity and detect possible anomalies at run-time. Once anomalies have been detected, so-called attack trees can be used to identify possible types of attacks. However, this approach is vulnerable to camouflage, by which attackers try to evade detection (and correct identification) by deliberately manipulating also the system's observed control flow. In this paper, we outline a model-based approach that provides more robust intrusion detection and attack identification through an architecture that combines software- with hardware-based monitoring. In this approach, software-level observation indicates suspicious activities, while hardware-level monitoring checks them separately in more detail, making it much harder for attacks to camouflage themselves and go undetected. We illustrate the approach with an authentication-service example that captures a realistic failure mode: a software-level observer sees an anomalous but apparently harmless control-flow deviation, maps it to a benign root cause in an attack tree, but misses the true intrusion. A second, independent hardware control-flow monitor observes the actual transition sequence and thereby changes the attack-tree diagnosis from a low-severity configuration or maintenance issue to a high-confidence code-injection or control-flow hijack. In this scenario, the proposed combination of control-flow anomaly detection, attack-tree based intrusion identification, and hardware-based monitoring can improve not only anomaly detection, but also the diagnostic precision of attack-tree-based cyber-attack identification. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-13 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11802 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T05:08:46.734Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-13?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).