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Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks — arXiv:2609.20877
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-10T02:52:19.141Z
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Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks — arXiv:2609.20877 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_45d921cdec01 (Metraipolis archive dc_45d921cdec01, sha256 6ae54c95ddd999cef1d19261b37a7fd6eb44e214e020926ba2f0fe6d9af5b4de)
BibTeX
@misc{dc45d921cdec01,
title = {Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks — arXiv:2609.20877},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_45d921cdec01; sha256 6ae54c95ddd999cef1d19261b37a7fd6eb44e214e020926ba2f0fe6d9af5b4de},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We propose an information-theoretic authentication protocol based on a finite supply of long quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field, where the effective key length after one signature exposure is the residual dimension $r=n-\ell$. A computationally unbounded adversary observes one valid classical signature and may jointly process $N$ public-key copies, while verification uses one additional independent copy. We show that, conditioned on the exposed signature, the security problem reduces to a partial-prediction game for a uniform stabilizer ensemble on these $r$ residual qudits, with a partial query along $d=\operatorname{rank}(Y-Y')$ directions, where $Y$ and $Y'$ denote the honestly signed and target-forged messages, respectively. Surprisingly, although the target requires only partial information, there is no first-order reduction in the required copy rate when $d/r\to\beta\in(0,1]$. The optimal average forgery probability for the specified target tends to zero for $N/r\to\alpha<1$ and to one for $\alpha>1$, revealing a sharp threshold at $\alpha=1$. Thus, long stabilizer public keys resist finite-copy forgery attacks under a single-signature-exposure model whenever the adversarial copy rate remains below one.
Tema degli esploratori: fisica e astronomia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-21 in quant-ph).
Categorie arXiv: Quantum Physics (quant-ph).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T02:31:30.409Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/quant-ph/2026-09-21?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).