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Kidney Exchange with Dual Donors — arXiv:2610.41466

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41466
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-03T07:58:19.390Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 73ad6786d36fa756260bc75108f8115d0f7a25ba06f4c446692fe32f67aba6c2
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4523b751eaad

How to cite

Kidney Exchange with Dual Donors — arXiv:2610.41466 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41466 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4523b751eaad (Metraipolis archive dc_4523b751eaad, sha256 73ad6786d36fa756260bc75108f8115d0f7a25ba06f4c446692fe32f67aba6c2)

BibTeX

@misc{dc4523b751eaad,
  title = {Kidney Exchange with Dual Donors — arXiv:2610.41466},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41466},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4523b751eaad; sha256 73ad6786d36fa756260bc75108f8115d0f7a25ba06f4c446692fe32f67aba6c2},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41466. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Kidney exchange programs enable patients with incompatible living donors to receive transplants by exchanging donors with other patient-donor pairs. Existing models typically assume either that each patient enrolls with a single donor, or that at most one of a patient's multiple alternative donors is selected to donate. In practice, however, a patient may have access to multiple willing but incompatible donors who are all prepared to donate simultaneously if doing so enables the patient to receive a kidney. We study a dual-donor kidney exchange model, in which a patient may enroll with up to two proxy donors and the exchange is allowed to utilize both, provided the patient receives a compatible transplant. This paradigm allows a patient to participate in an exchange cycle via one donor while their second donor initiates a donation chain---unlocking additional transplants without relying on altruistic donors. We formulate the resulting combinatorial optimization problems under realistic cycle and chain constraints, showing that utilizing both donors introduces sharp computational challenges compared to standard exchange, and we design new approximation algorithms with provable guarantees. We also study strategic manipulation when patients hide a donor, establishing the limits of deterministic mechanisms and showing how randomization achieves truthfulness with near-optimal welfare. Finally, our experiments on realistic synthetic graphs demonstrate that using both donors yields substantial gains in total transplants over selecting at most one---even when only a small fraction of patients enroll with two donors.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41466 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T07:51:01.014Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).