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To EFX OR to MMS, That is the Question — arXiv:2608.10397
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10397
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T06:15:06.594Z
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To EFX OR to MMS, That is the Question — arXiv:2608.10397 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10397 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4486330bded9 (Metraipolis archive dc_4486330bded9, sha256 3845e502194babb85e75808b7567b96e10a7497a9a82e42bacb2c3e354bb74c0)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4486330bded9,
title = {To EFX OR to MMS, That is the Question — arXiv:2608.10397},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10397},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4486330bded9; sha256 3845e502194babb85e75808b7567b96e10a7497a9a82e42bacb2c3e354bb74c0},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10397. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study the agent-wise disjunction of two central fairness notions for indivisible items, where every agent must be either envy-free up to any item (EFX) or maximin-share (MMS) satisfied. One might expect that having a flexible fairness requirement for individual agents will restore existence, especially because the existence of EFX itself resisted resolution for nearly a decade. Surprisingly, it does not. We construct counterexamples with three agents and eight submodular goods, and with three agents and seven submodular chores, significantly strengthening recent EFX impossibility results. On the positive side, we prove existence for additive mixed items with at most three valuation types when one type is a singleton. Additionally, we obtain polynomial-time approximation schemes for additive goods-only and chores-only instances. We also identify a clean separation between the disjunction and its constituents: For additive chores with two valuation types, EFX and MMS are both known to fail, whereas an EFX $\vee$ MMS allocation always exists. Finally, we show that identical additive valuations even admit the conjunction EFX $\wedge$ MMS for mixed items. Overall, our results show that allowing flexibility in choosing agent-specific fairness certificates expands the frontier of fair solutions while also uncovering surprising impossibilities. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-12 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10397 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T06:10:07.746Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-12?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).