Metraipolis › archive › dc_43e33337915a
Toward Secure AI-Powered Penetration Testing Agents: Security Threats, Guardrails, and Architectural Perspectives — arXiv:2609.16694
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16694
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-15T19:33:09.781Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
2d7e567b3448b4ed4155f4370b59710aeaa730899270c7bc456e6de9bd5729be- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_43e33337915a
How to cite
Toward Secure AI-Powered Penetration Testing Agents: Security Threats, Guardrails, and Architectural Perspectives — arXiv:2609.16694 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16694 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_43e33337915a (Metraipolis archive dc_43e33337915a, sha256 2d7e567b3448b4ed4155f4370b59710aeaa730899270c7bc456e6de9bd5729be)
BibTeX
@misc{dc43e33337915a,
title = {Toward Secure AI-Powered Penetration Testing Agents: Security Threats, Guardrails, and Architectural Perspectives — arXiv:2609.16694},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16694},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_43e33337915a; sha256 2d7e567b3448b4ed4155f4370b59710aeaa730899270c7bc456e6de9bd5729be},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16694. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
LLM-powered autonomous agents are transforming the penetration testing space with dynamic, multi-step offensive security workflows that require minimal supervision by humans. These agents leverage sophisticated reasoning abilities and external security tools to independently carry out reconnaissance, identify vulnerabilities, devise exploitation plans, and perform post-exploitation operations. But the ability to have persistent memory, to take actions in the real world, and to do long-horizon reasoning raises qualitatively different security concerns than traditional chat-based LLM systems. Existing guardrail mechanisms for conversational AI may not be sufficient to secure autonomous AI pentesting agents accordingly. To address these issues, we carry out a comprehensive security analysis on autonomous AI-penetration testing agents. We systematically analyse representative agent architectures, characterise their trust boundaries and attack surfaces and propose a threat taxonomy that is aligned with the lifecycle and covers LLM lifecycle attacks, agent-architecture attacks and cross-cutting behavioural attacks. We analyse the limitations of existing guardrail mechanisms, identify key research gaps, and discuss future research directions for developing specialised, context-aware, and architecture-aware guardrails to secure next-generation AI-driven offensive security systems. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-16 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16694 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-15T18:42:42.625Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-16?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).