Metraipolis › archive › dc_435fcb8857bd

Signaling via Money — arXiv:2610.03146

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03146
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T11:39:18.568Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
99b76d32015a2314439392ad2838f2c1461b19e3f4b98bad2c5aab28e249db37
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_435fcb8857bd

How to cite

Signaling via Money — arXiv:2610.03146 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03146 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_435fcb8857bd (Metraipolis archive dc_435fcb8857bd, sha256 99b76d32015a2314439392ad2838f2c1461b19e3f4b98bad2c5aab28e249db37)
BibTeX
@misc{dc435fcb8857bd,
  title = {Signaling via Money — arXiv:2610.03146},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03146},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_435fcb8857bd; sha256 99b76d32015a2314439392ad2838f2c1461b19e3f4b98bad2c5aab28e249db37},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03146. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study mechanisms in which agents' preferences depend both on an object allocation and on a third party's beliefs about private information. A mechanism determines an allocation, transfers, and sends signals to the aftermarket. We compare two informational environments: (i) private transfers, where the aftermarket observes allocations and signals, and (ii) public transfers, where transfers are publicly observable. Our main result shows that any equilibrium outcome implementable with hidden transfers can be approximated arbitrarily well with public transfers. Thus, transfer observability generates at most a vanishing informational distortion and helps rationalize the common assumption that transfers remain hidden from aftermarkets.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-05 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03146 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T10:03:03.644Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-10-05?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).