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A Topological Condition for Aggregation on Weak Preference Domains — arXiv:2609.35866

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35866
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T20:46:09.707Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d7ed9030d8e55de4f4b782f0c8dcc8dfe14ae0b1b613ffc2f0bbaf1a7a3e0ae1
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How to cite

A Topological Condition for Aggregation on Weak Preference Domains — arXiv:2609.35866 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35866 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4242dcc9bc45 (Metraipolis archive dc_4242dcc9bc45, sha256 d7ed9030d8e55de4f4b782f0c8dcc8dfe14ae0b1b613ffc2f0bbaf1a7a3e0ae1)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4242dcc9bc45,
  title = {A Topological Condition for Aggregation on Weak Preference Domains — arXiv:2609.35866},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35866},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4242dcc9bc45; sha256 d7ed9030d8e55de4f4b782f0c8dcc8dfe14ae0b1b613ffc2f0bbaf1a7a3e0ae1},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35866. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper provides a topological construction for studying social aggregation of weak preferences over a finite set of alternatives. We identify weak preferences with the cells of the type $A_{n-1}$ braid arrangement and, equivalently, with the simplices of the corresponding type $A_{n-1}$ Coxeter complex, which we call the preference complex. Then we define face-monotonicity by requiring a social welfare function to be order-preserving when viewed as a map between the preference-profile poset and the preference poset. We prove that if a common preference domain admits a unanimous, anonymous, and face-monotonic social welfare function, then every connected component of the geometric realization of its order complex is contractible. We then apply this construction to two restricted domains. For fixed-extrema domains, we prove that their order-complex realizations are contractible and define a unanimous, anonymous, and face-monotonic social welfare function using the meet operation. For single-peaked domains, we prove that the corresponding subcomplex of the preference complex has a contractible realization and, in the three-alternative case, construct a unanimous, anonymous, and face-monotonic social welfare function.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35866 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T20:06:55.282Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).