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Learning Parametric Monotone Games — arXiv:2609.02494

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02494
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T05:25:50.593Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
31d82dab0760a7af1713a7c9223cfa7713767822818e4fc827930b1479dffc94
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_41cb305726ed

How to cite

Learning Parametric Monotone Games — arXiv:2609.02494 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02494 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_41cb305726ed (Metraipolis archive dc_41cb305726ed, sha256 31d82dab0760a7af1713a7c9223cfa7713767822818e4fc827930b1479dffc94)
BibTeX
@misc{dc41cb305726ed,
  title = {Learning Parametric Monotone Games — arXiv:2609.02494},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02494},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_41cb305726ed; sha256 31d82dab0760a7af1713a7c9223cfa7713767822818e4fc827930b1479dffc94},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02494. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the problem of learning from data a parametric Nash equilibrium (NE) problem that is monotone (or strongly monotone) for all parameter values. In the presence of local and shared convex constraints, monotonicity enables efficient computation of generalized Nash equilibria of the learned game. We consider two learning scenarios: (i) direct learning of the NE problem from samples of the agents' costs, and (ii) inverse learning of surrogate agents' costs from samples of their best responses. We propose two methods to solve these tasks. The first is a penalty-based approach that promotes monotonicity of the learned game during training. The second, based on a representation theorem we introduce for a broad class of monotone games, parameterizes the agents' costs so that monotonicity of the NE problem is guaranteed by construction, for all parameter values, regardless of the training data used. We illustrate the applicability of the proposed methods on several numerical examples. A Python library and the examples reported in the paper are available at this https URL .

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-03 in math.OC).
Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02494 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T04:44:15.059Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-03?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).