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AgentKernel: The Trust-Native Agentic Operating System — arXiv:2609.29647
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29647
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:27:39.926Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
60704d270b7383b7d6f9381dc4c7836933f5c6197f87f8b69a31503ecfe610ef- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
AgentKernel: The Trust-Native Agentic Operating System — arXiv:2609.29647 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29647 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_41c053eb0963 (Metraipolis archive dc_41c053eb0963, sha256 60704d270b7383b7d6f9381dc4c7836933f5c6197f87f8b69a31503ecfe610ef)
BibTeX
@misc{dc41c053eb0963,
title = {AgentKernel: The Trust-Native Agentic Operating System — arXiv:2609.29647},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29647},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_41c053eb0963; sha256 60704d270b7383b7d6f9381dc4c7836933f5c6197f87f8b69a31503ecfe610ef},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29647. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Modern AI agents routinely cross trust boundaries: they ingest untrusted content, combine it with privileged instructions, persist intermediate beliefs in long-term memory, and invoke privileged tools. This creates an attack surface in which malicious payloads can enter through model inputs and cause harmful tool actions. Yet current governance stacks remain application-level middleware that share a process trust boundary with the agents they monitor. We argue that agents need an operating-system substrate providing mandatory, non-bypassable services for identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control. We introduce AgentKernel, a trust-native agent operating system built around the premise that security must be a first-class design constraint. AgentKernel wraps the agent lifecycle in a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars: Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution. Each pillar adapts classical OS security principles to failures at the semantic plane, including delegation abuse, prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. AgentKernel treats structural security as a capability multiplier. Kernel-managed identity supports trustworthy cross-organization collaboration; graduated perception replaces brittle single-point filters; information-flow-controlled memory improves retrieval fidelity while limiting poisoning; and semantic-to-kernel enforcement permits broader tool privileges behind a non-bypassable boundary. We position AgentKernel as the missing OS layer beneath orchestration frameworks, agent runtimes, governance platforms, and execution sandboxes, and use systematic comparison and security analysis to show how a single integrated architecture can enforce security across the full agent lifecycle. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29647 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T03:50:58.118Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).