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Strike Price Optimization for ISO New England's Day-Ahead Ancillary Services — arXiv:2608.29366

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29366
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T09:02:50.019Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
57cda006aa74a920dc4b6e4c12e0ef0fb8514f730c34cb96b9dbb057c8660462
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_419e463dde8d

How to cite

Strike Price Optimization for ISO New England's Day-Ahead Ancillary Services — arXiv:2608.29366 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29366 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_419e463dde8d (Metraipolis archive dc_419e463dde8d, sha256 57cda006aa74a920dc4b6e4c12e0ef0fb8514f730c34cb96b9dbb057c8660462)
BibTeX
@misc{dc419e463dde8d,
  title = {Strike Price Optimization for ISO New England's Day-Ahead Ancillary Services — arXiv:2608.29366},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29366},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_419e463dde8d; sha256 57cda006aa74a920dc4b6e4c12e0ef0fb8514f730c34cb96b9dbb057c8660462},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29366. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

ISO New England's (ISO-NE) Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Initiative settles reserve products as financial call options on real-time energy prices. The system-wide strike price creates an efficiency-reliability tradeoff: increasing it lowers competitive reserve offers, but weakens resources' incentives to incur preparation costs and remain available for real-time performance. The existing strike price rule does not explicitly account for heterogeneous resource incentives and reserve requirements. We develop an optimization framework that selects the highest strike price while ensuring that enough resources retain an incentive to prepare and collectively satisfy the reserve requirements. Because a resource's preparation decision may affect the resulting real-time price distribution, its incentive depends on an unobservable counterfactual. To address this, we derive a tight lower-bound certificate using only the available conditional price distribution and a bound on the resource's price impact. We show that each resource enters the optimization through a single incentive threshold and that any finite optimal strike price occurs at one of these thresholds. This yields a tractable exact solution method based on threshold calculations and a small number of linear feasibility checks. Using reconstructed ISO-NE conditional price distributions and representative gas-fired resources, we find that higher heat-rate combustion turbines are more likely than combined-cycle resources to constrain the strike price choice.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in math.OC).
Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29366 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T08:40:19.737Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).