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Social Preferences and Cooperation: Beliefs, Robustness, and the Limits of Altruism — arXiv:2609.11374
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11374
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T07:13:24.939Z
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Social Preferences and Cooperation: Beliefs, Robustness, and the Limits of Altruism — arXiv:2609.11374 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11374 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4130d00d0cbc (Metraipolis archive dc_4130d00d0cbc, sha256 364b579900ea2621796b6b463bc299af1f2ee870528178c7ac089530015c342e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc4130d00d0cbc,
title = {Social Preferences and Cooperation: Beliefs, Robustness, and the Limits of Altruism — arXiv:2609.11374},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11374},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_4130d00d0cbc; sha256 364b579900ea2621796b6b463bc299af1f2ee870528178c7ac089530015c342e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11374. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study a mechanism of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Incorporating social preferences as efficiency concerns into the PD game, we study how altruism translates into cooperation. Under complete information, cooperation requires the opponent's altruism to clear a threshold. We then introduce a subjective extension of Bayesian Nash equilibrium that relaxes the Common Prior Assumption, letting players hold heterogeneous, potentially misspecified beliefs about each other's altruistic type. Cooperation then depends on beliefs about altruism rather than altruism itself, and can be sustained even when opponents are, on average, only weakly altruistic. When fear of exploitation dominates the temptation to defect, beliefs about the opponent's cooperation become strategic complements, so a cooperative and an uncooperative equilibrium can coexist under identical payoffs and an identical, correctly specified prior. Using multiplier preferences, we then study how robust this belief-driven cooperation is to model misspecification. Cooperation is fragile: it survives only above a threshold level of confidence in one's own belief, and can unravel even when the belief itself correctly supports cooperation. As a formal extension, the same robust-control apparatus, applied to a player's action choice, nests Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and logit Quantal Response Equilibrium as limiting cases. Cooperation depends less on how altruistic agents are than on what they believe about each other, and how confident they are that this belief is right. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11374 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T06:56:22.181Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).