Metraipolis › archive › dc_40cd7f0d26ac

Not Discrete Enough: On the Inherent Insecurity of dTPMs for Measured Boot — arXiv:2608.14736

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14736
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T19:33:49.806Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
57a6a7ec4c87476c5ebabe67b861d3f6f1a15b0eeee3b93a88f33880f81b0f98
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_40cd7f0d26ac

How to cite

Not Discrete Enough: On the Inherent Insecurity of dTPMs for Measured Boot — arXiv:2608.14736 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14736 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_40cd7f0d26ac (Metraipolis archive dc_40cd7f0d26ac, sha256 57a6a7ec4c87476c5ebabe67b861d3f6f1a15b0eeee3b93a88f33880f81b0f98)
BibTeX
@misc{dc40cd7f0d26ac,
  title = {Not Discrete Enough: On the Inherent Insecurity of dTPMs for Measured Boot — arXiv:2608.14736},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14736},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_40cd7f0d26ac; sha256 57a6a7ec4c87476c5ebabe67b861d3f6f1a15b0eeee3b93a88f33880f81b0f98},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14736. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Measured Boot, a mechanism enabled through Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), is commonly used for passwordless protection of data-at-rest, aiming to protect data when the device is lost or stolen. Microsoft's standpoint is neutral on which way a TPM should be implemented: Firmware-based TPMs (fTPMs) are viewed as more economical but less secure. Despite the inherent susceptibility to bus sniffing attacks, discrete TPMs (dTPMs) are still seen as the gold standard, as many deliver better on-paper tamper resistance. It is often argued that attacks against the bus can be mitigated by bus encryption and, ideally, mutual authentication between the CPU and TPM. This position paper aims to emphasize another inherent, difficult-to-mitigate attack against dTPMs that was originally shown against a TPM 1.1 over 20 years ago: We demonstrate that even brief physical access to a TPM 2.0 and the ability to boot from an attacker-controlled system enable an attacker to reset and replay arbitrary measurements, thereby allowing an attacker to unseal, for example, a disk encryption key solely protected by the TPM. While there have been attacks against fTPMs, too, we argue that their practical attack surface is fundamentally smaller. Bus protection techniques can be used to protect dTPMs, but only guard against passive attacks. After all, we argue that, from a security standpoint, firmware TPMs, or any TPM internal to the SoC, are superior to discrete (external) ones. Lastly, in order for dTPM-based setups to provide meaningful protection of sealed secrets, configurations must require a user-provided PIN or password along with the Measured Boot configuration.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14736 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T19:01:59.101Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).