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Weak Atomic Continuity and Subgame Perfection — arXiv:2611.06620
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06620
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-05T18:39:33.957Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Weak Atomic Continuity and Subgame Perfection — arXiv:2611.06620 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06620 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3ee46ddcf085 (Metraipolis archive dc_3ee46ddcf085, sha256 abc161cc636892d72df8a4acd1cd7c37e58da1ea0c049545c4c83a33413e10e5)
BibTeX
@misc{dc3ee46ddcf085,
title = {Weak Atomic Continuity and Subgame Perfection — arXiv:2611.06620},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06620},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3ee46ddcf085; sha256 abc161cc636892d72df8a4acd1cd7c37e58da1ea0c049545c4c83a33413e10e5},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06620. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Subgame-perfect equilibrium need not exist in continuous games with perfect information when Nature moves. Under standard regularity assumptions, we prove that weak atomic continuity of Nature's transition probabilities yields a measurable pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium for finite and infinite horizons. The condition, originating in the population genetics literature, is necessary for the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium uniformly over the remaining primitives: whenever this condition is violated, one can construct a dynamic game with no subgame-perfect equilibrium, even in behavioral strategies. The proof preserves compactness and upper hemicontinuity of continuation payoff correspondences under integration without requiring convexity. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06620 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-05T18:31:31.579Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).