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Breaking Ambient Trust: In-Network Per-Process Access Control Against Lateral Movement — arXiv:2608.29979

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29979
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T08:25:43.890Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f696caef5b14f8343e06660466cbe4d1ee6b4745b2955fa774ac1bccd3a23618
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3df0fa0ec6d9

How to cite

Breaking Ambient Trust: In-Network Per-Process Access Control Against Lateral Movement — arXiv:2608.29979 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29979 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3df0fa0ec6d9 (Metraipolis archive dc_3df0fa0ec6d9, sha256 f696caef5b14f8343e06660466cbe4d1ee6b4745b2955fa774ac1bccd3a23618)
BibTeX
@misc{dc3df0fa0ec6d9,
  title = {Breaking Ambient Trust: In-Network Per-Process Access Control Against Lateral Movement — arXiv:2608.29979},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29979},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3df0fa0ec6d9; sha256 f696caef5b14f8343e06660466cbe4d1ee6b4745b2955fa774ac1bccd3a23618},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29979. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Enterprise networks remain vulnerable to Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), where adversaries gain an initial foothold and move laterally across the network, accumulating access permissions hop by hop to reach critical targets. Existing network defenses cannot track user movement at the process level across the network; instead, they grant ambient trust to all processes within a host. As a result, once a host is compromised, malicious processes inherit the victim's permissions, thereby expanding the attacker's access scope and enabling further lateral movement. To address this gap, we present NetZone, an in-network access control that confines each user process to a fixed access scope that persists as the user moves across the network. NetZone introduces a new abstraction, called AccessScope, which represents a lightweight access capability bound to the user's processes. Each AccessScope encodes the set of hosts a user identity is authorized to access and is embedded in the process's outgoing network traffic for validation before reaching its destination. As users pivot across hosts, AccessScope propagates with their traffic, rebinds to the receiving process, and persists across hosts. This ensures that regardless of network location, the user's processes are consistently governed by their bound AccessScope and their access permissions remain unchanged. To handle the high volume of network traffic generated by processes, we develop a data-plane co-design that integrates programmable switches with eBPF. NetZone employs a set of in-network optimizations and lightweight AccessScope persistence techniques to inspect the embedded AccessScope on the fly, enabling line-rate processing of high traffic volumes with negligible latency overhead. Our extensive evaluations show that NetZone can effectively defend against sophisticated attack scenarios without introducing noticeable overhead.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29979 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T08:10:59.877Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).