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When are complements and substitutes dual? — arXiv:2610.39844
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39844
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-31T06:24:10.824Z
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When are complements and substitutes dual? — arXiv:2610.39844 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39844 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3bb83238350e (Metraipolis archive dc_3bb83238350e, sha256 f545b6e9a51344647ddb07c3fbfe9b584fd88fba3f22fa5540dac7ff4d658524)
BibTeX
@misc{dc3bb83238350e,
title = {When are complements and substitutes dual? — arXiv:2610.39844},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39844},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3bb83238350e; sha256 f545b6e9a51344647ddb07c3fbfe9b584fd88fba3f22fa5540dac7ff4d658524},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39844. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
For binary-action games on bipartite networks, strategic complements and strategic substitutes are one and the same: each can be transformed into the other by relabelling the actions of every player on exactly one side. In this note, I show that bipartiteness is necessary and sufficient for such a relabelling; as a consequence, bipartite networks are precisely those on which every binary-action game with strategic substitutes must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.GN, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39844 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-31T06:09:23.310Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.GN/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).