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The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets — arXiv:2609.27304

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27304
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T10:08:08.597Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d3f9865c59e096fa4aab2e22ff7beba4cc46873a651416a7f88ee5e83b00f612
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How to cite

The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets — arXiv:2609.27304 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27304 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3a76b80aa7ca (Metraipolis archive dc_3a76b80aa7ca, sha256 d3f9865c59e096fa4aab2e22ff7beba4cc46873a651416a7f88ee5e83b00f612)
BibTeX
@misc{dc3a76b80aa7ca,
  title = {The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets — arXiv:2609.27304},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27304},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3a76b80aa7ca; sha256 d3f9865c59e096fa4aab2e22ff7beba4cc46873a651416a7f88ee5e83b00f612},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27304. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with $m$ unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from $F_B$ and $n$ unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from $F_S$. When $m \ge n$ and buyer valuations first-order stochastically dominate seller costs ($F_B \succeq_{\mathrm{FSD}} F_S$), we prove that recruiting just two additional sellers enables Seller Trade Reduction (STR), a prior-independent mechanism, to achieve expected Gains From Trade (GFT) at least the first-best GFT of the original market. When the buyer side is the smaller side of the market ($m \le n$), an analogous result holds for Buyer Trade Reduction with 2 additional buyers. This resolves open questions of Babaioff, Goldner, and Gonczarowski (SODA 2020) and Cai, Liaw, Mehta, and Zhao (STOC 2024). We complement our upper bound by showing that this uniform bound is optimal: already for $m = n = 1$, no prior-free mechanism (deterministic or randomized) that is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, individually rational, and weakly budget-balanced can match the first-best GFT by recruiting only one additional seller.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-24 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27304 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T09:15:27.387Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).