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Full Justified Representation under Hare and Droop Quotas in Polynomial Time — arXiv:2608.05417

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05417
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-26T20:01:43.078Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
601d343f02c98ff50f0b7d1553a3d7f614be6c8d5e6b80d2ca4780b58770c9b7
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_39bd88a7fdfe

How to cite

Full Justified Representation under Hare and Droop Quotas in Polynomial Time — arXiv:2608.05417 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05417 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_39bd88a7fdfe (Metraipolis archive dc_39bd88a7fdfe, sha256 601d343f02c98ff50f0b7d1553a3d7f614be6c8d5e6b80d2ca4780b58770c9b7)
BibTeX
@misc{dc39bd88a7fdfe,
  title = {Full Justified Representation under Hare and Droop Quotas in Polynomial Time — arXiv:2608.05417},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05417},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_39bd88a7fdfe; sha256 601d343f02c98ff50f0b7d1553a3d7f614be6c8d5e6b80d2ca4780b58770c9b7},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05417. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

I study Full Justified Representation (FJR) in approval-based multiwinner elections under both the Hare and Droop quota conventions. I introduce a descending-budget algorithm in which voters distribute their remaining budgets across their current representation gaps and candidates are purchased whenever the resulting offers cover a common price. With candidate price $\lambda_H=n/k$, the algorithm returns a Hare-FJR committee; with candidate price $\lambda_D=n/(k+1)$, it returns a committee satisfying the more demanding Droop-FJR axiom of Casey and Elkind. The two guarantees share a historical-payment invariant and a terminal row--column accounting argument, while the Droop proof requires a new residual-budget argument when all $k$ paid seats are filled. Both variants are deterministic once the voter and candidate orders are fixed and use $O(kmn)$ rational operations.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-07 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05417 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-26T19:47:33.602Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).