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Strategic communication of narratives: An experiment — arXiv:2609.10074
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T07:54:30.871Z
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Strategic communication of narratives: An experiment — arXiv:2609.10074 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_39b27fd7df28 (Metraipolis archive dc_39b27fd7df28, sha256 3563b5fb85f6f8ea81c4a242dcb6cb4f192e9e2e20b6dd7f75f6f7a38f611209)
BibTeX
@misc{dc39b27fd7df28,
title = {Strategic communication of narratives: An experiment — arXiv:2609.10074},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_39b27fd7df28; sha256 3563b5fb85f6f8ea81c4a242dcb6cb4f192e9e2e20b6dd7f75f6f7a38f611209},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We investigate the strategic communication of narratives under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data-generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret the data, but aware of the sender's incentives to strategically provide interpretations (``narratives''). We theoretically show that the size of the conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver is a crucial determinant of equilibrium communication. In particular, the stronger the sender's bias, (i) the more senders exaggerate their information and (ii) the more receivers correct the sender's action recommendations. In a laboratory experiment, we find evidence in line with both predictions, suggesting that people in complex and uncertain environments take a narrator's strategic incentives into account. Additional analyses reveal that narrative likelihood does not drive receiver behavior and that narratives are, on average, slightly persuasive only when bias is low. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-10 in econ.GN). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; General Economics (econ.GN). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T07:31:05.756Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).