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The Native-Signature Boundary in Post-Quantum Distributed Authorization — arXiv:2609.03547

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03547
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-17T02:04:00.723Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 58989c47df5449d827fdf0fb8135df8db5247f63acd079ecd0914f2091372be5
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_372a437bb36e

How to cite

The Native-Signature Boundary in Post-Quantum Distributed Authorization — arXiv:2609.03547 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03547 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_372a437bb36e (Metraipolis archive dc_372a437bb36e, sha256 58989c47df5449d827fdf0fb8135df8db5247f63acd079ecd0914f2091372be5)

BibTeX

@misc{dc372a437bb36e,
  title = {The Native-Signature Boundary in Post-Quantum Distributed Authorization — arXiv:2609.03547},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03547},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_372a437bb36e; sha256 58989c47df5449d827fdf0fb8135df8db5247f63acd079ecd0914f2091372be5},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03547. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Post-quantum signature migration poses a distinct systems problem when authorization is distributed among multiple parties. In native threshold signing, the signature algorithm may determine key generation, share state, preprocessing, interaction, combination, refresh, and recovery. Architectures that evaluate threshold policy outside the native signing relation can reduce this coupling, but their authorization evidence is not accepted by an unchanged native verifier unless a trusted complete-key signer translates approval into a native signature. This paper organizes that design boundary through three properties: native-signature compatibility, unilateral-signing resistance, and threshold-layer agility. We classify specialized threshold signatures, generic MPC signing, distributed hash-based constructions, programmable multisignature and dual-gate authorization, and threshold-authorized HSM signing. A migration impact surface identifies which components change with the signature algorithm. Across the surveyed families, no design simultaneously provides native output, unilateral-signing resistance, and threshold-layer agility. This is an architectural tension, not an impossibility claim, and it clarifies why a replaceable API alone does not make distributed authorization cryptographically agile.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03547 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T01:28:02.801Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).