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Functional Converses for Private Matrix-Product Retrieval under Library-Wide Decoder-Side Correlation — arXiv:2611.07325

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07325
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-06T14:53:01.714Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
963bfff663aab4f495c9b86bf79fd8b25d13f7d78e27caea2b16202ac094d984
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_35f02db00219

How to cite

Functional Converses for Private Matrix-Product Retrieval under Library-Wide Decoder-Side Correlation — arXiv:2611.07325 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07325 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_35f02db00219 (Metraipolis archive dc_35f02db00219, sha256 963bfff663aab4f495c9b86bf79fd8b25d13f7d78e27caea2b16202ac094d984)
BibTeX
@misc{dc35f02db00219,
  title = {Functional Converses for Private Matrix-Product Retrieval under Library-Wide Decoder-Side Correlation — arXiv:2611.07325},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07325},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_35f02db00219; sha256 963bfff663aab4f495c9b86bf79fd8b25d13f7d78e27caea2b16202ac094d984},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07325. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We consider private retrieval of the matrix product $A^\top B^{(\theta)}$ from replicated $P_c$-colluding servers when $B^{(\ell)}=A+N^{(\ell)}$, with the innovations mutually independent and independent of the user-held $A\in\mathbb{F}_q^{m\times m}$. The servers store the full library, correlated with $A$, which changes both the communication problem and the security definition: a secrecy condition including the stored library cannot hold, as the library itself partly reveals $A$. We therefore measure only additional leakage and require index privacy conditioned on $A$; both reduce to classical notions under independence. For $A$ of rank $k<m$ we prove, with no structural hypothesis on the map, $D^*\geq H(A^\top B^{(\theta)}\mid A)/C_{\mathrm{PIR}}(N,P_c,L)-o(km)$, where $C_{\mathrm{PIR}}(N,P_c,L)$ is the replicated $P_c$-colluding private-information-retrieval capacity. The proof rests on a colluding converse for servers storing arbitrary refinements of the demanded messages, whose answers need not be measurable functions of the functional-message library, and a privacy-transfer characterization. Publishing a canonical row-space representative makes the bound achievable for arbitrary independent and identically distributed innovations under a public-setup measure. Under a strengthened observational model (exact correctness, common conditional library support, and full-transcript security), concealment forces $D\geq H(G_m N^{(\theta)})/C_{\mathrm{PIR}}$, where $G_m$ spans the linear join of all row spaces in the support of the operand distribution; this extends to vanishing error under a simultaneous-decodability assumption. In the full-rank case product recovery reduces to innovation recovery: $D^*=H(N^{(\theta)})/C_{\mathrm{PIR}}+o(m^2)$.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (elenco arXiv math.IT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Information Theory (cs.IT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07325 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-06T14:24:46.056Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/math.IT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).