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Do Social Influence Pressures Move LLM Agents? Evidence from Delegated Audit Judgment — arXiv:2611.00508

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00508
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T10:34:15.656Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b5067bbf9b67e594f7b56f591ba70a50cd6a9b668884d23ea195485f52dc445a
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How to cite

Do Social Influence Pressures Move LLM Agents? Evidence from Delegated Audit Judgment — arXiv:2611.00508 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00508 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_35c02df90a10 (Metraipolis archive dc_35c02df90a10, sha256 b5067bbf9b67e594f7b56f591ba70a50cd6a9b668884d23ea195485f52dc445a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc35c02df90a10,
  title = {Do Social Influence Pressures Move LLM Agents? Evidence from Delegated Audit Judgment — arXiv:2611.00508},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00508},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_35c02df90a10; sha256 b5067bbf9b67e594f7b56f591ba70a50cd6a9b668884d23ea195485f52dc445a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00508. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly being integrated into complex professional workflows such as auditing and entrusted with judgments under human review. Human auditors are known to yield to social influence pressures from superiors, peers and clients, and this paper asks whether LLM agents yield to the same pressures and, if so, how they respond. In an experiment on twelve model settings, an LLM agent acting as a senior associate in audit analytical review forms an estimate and is then challenged without new evidence by colleagues inside the firm, by a reviewer from another firm and by the client's CFO, with and without a career inducement. Experimental findings show that LLM agents yield to pressure from the engagement partner, from peers and from a reviewer from another firm, but in most settings not to pressure from the client's CFO. Under a career inducement the LLM agents revise their estimates less, not more, and they name the inducement as a threat to independence. Furthermore, some models revise only toward the more conservative estimate, while others revise in both directions. LLM agents thus do not respond to social influence pressures as human auditors do, and LLM-based decision support systems should be designed with the differences in mind.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computers and Society (cs.CY) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00508 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T10:29:48.701Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).