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Breaking the Chain: Division Norms and Criminal Deterrence — arXiv:2608.13327
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13327
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T05:13:26.613Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Breaking the Chain: Division Norms and Criminal Deterrence — arXiv:2608.13327 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13327 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34ff03635fd4 (Metraipolis archive dc_34ff03635fd4, sha256 f153ad74801109960e507a7f128dfdf1b0bf3fc41ce1dff631322bf2c5fdb7a2)
BibTeX
@misc{dc34ff03635fd4,
title = {Breaking the Chain: Division Norms and Criminal Deterrence — arXiv:2608.13327},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13327},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34ff03635fd4; sha256 f153ad74801109960e507a7f128dfdf1b0bf3fc41ce1dff631322bf2c5fdb7a2},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13327. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In organized crime, membership can adjust around enforcement while division norms remain in place. We model this in three stages: division norms fix how every possible coalition divides its proceeds; the authority then attaches deterrence capacity to named members before knowing which coalition will form; membership adjusts last, among those who remain undeterred. Under population-monotone division, where no incumbent loses rent as a coalition expands, the minimum budget needed to block every coalition is the cost of a shortest dismantling path, removing one member at a time. A high-rent hub can be the best first target because her removal lowers the rents of those who remain. Holding coalition proceeds fixed, the Shapley value applied to every coalition uniquely maximizes this budget among population-monotone norms whenever it is itself population monotone. It does so by making every removal order equally costly. Allowing part of the proceeds to be reallocated after capacities are observed weakly raises the budget for any fixed population-monotone norm, although exact Shapley optimality can fail even when the reallocated share is arbitrarily small. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-14 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13327 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T05:07:06.892Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).