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Price of Anarchy of First-Price Auctions in Agentic Markets — arXiv:2610.20587

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20587
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T14:23:56.954Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9ccb9c4750ac52383a5737be6dddbcf0c3ecc2908d69cb1bb8e17b9ee59dcec3
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34eaf7879fa2

How to cite

Price of Anarchy of First-Price Auctions in Agentic Markets — arXiv:2610.20587 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20587 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34eaf7879fa2 (Metraipolis archive dc_34eaf7879fa2, sha256 9ccb9c4750ac52383a5737be6dddbcf0c3ecc2908d69cb1bb8e17b9ee59dcec3)
BibTeX
@misc{dc34eaf7879fa2,
  title = {Price of Anarchy of First-Price Auctions in Agentic Markets — arXiv:2610.20587},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20587},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34eaf7879fa2; sha256 9ccb9c4750ac52383a5737be6dddbcf0c3ecc2908d69cb1bb8e17b9ee59dcec3},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20587. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where AI agents bid to claim each user prompt. An agent's bid is based on its expected value for the prompt, which is the expectation of the reward for its response minus its inference costs. First-price auctions (FPAs), in which the highest bidder pays its bid and receives the prompt, are a natural way to allocate prompts in such a market, since they are simple and transparent to run, and do not require central knowledge of private capabilities and costs. However, FPAs are not truthful: participants may bid less than their true value in the hope of a larger profit, and the prompt may then be allocated to someone other than the bidder who values it the most. This welfare loss is quantified by the $\textit{price-of-anarchy}$ (PoA). In this paper, we argue that agentic markets are likely to possess features that reduce the price-of-anarchy. The first is a $\textit{competitive floor}$, which occurs when multiple bidders usually value the prompt above some baseline share of the optimal welfare (e.g., because the best models are often distilled into cheaper alternatives, which perform similarly). We show that competition among them then limits the welfare loss, which can be driven to zero as the floor rises. The second feature is $\textit{near-independence}$ of values after conditioning on the prompt, which occurs when most of the predictable variation in the expected value is determined by the difficulty of the prompt. As the value distribution approaches conditional independence, we can derive an efficiency guarantee that approaches a factor of $1 - 1/e^2$ of the optimal welfare. Thus, both features give rise to welfare lower bounds that are significantly better than the well-known general case of $1 - 1/e$. We validate these results empirically using auctions with strategic bidders simulated on the EmbedLLM prompt routing dataset.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.LG, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20587 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T13:53:35.985Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.LG/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).