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Cross User/App Network Attacks - Hijacking TCP Connections and DNS Cache Poisoning via a Malicious User/App (Extended Version) — arXiv:2609.09345
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09345
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T07:54:35.854Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
b15b5b9dc5f408b93e1b5d2afb1a94d4693a477ea586e511283f267598a3491f- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Cross User/App Network Attacks - Hijacking TCP Connections and DNS Cache Poisoning via a Malicious User/App (Extended Version) — arXiv:2609.09345 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09345 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34142ec3be56 (Metraipolis archive dc_34142ec3be56, sha256 b15b5b9dc5f408b93e1b5d2afb1a94d4693a477ea586e511283f267598a3491f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc34142ec3be56,
title = {Cross User/App Network Attacks - Hijacking TCP Connections and DNS Cache Poisoning via a Malicious User/App (Extended Version) — arXiv:2609.09345},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09345},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_34142ec3be56; sha256 b15b5b9dc5f408b93e1b5d2afb1a94d4693a477ea586e511283f267598a3491f},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09345. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Off-path network attacks against TCP and DNS (over UDP) client-server connections are generally considered impractical nowadays, due to built-in security features in these protocols, e.g. randomized TCP (initial) sequence numbers and randomized UDP source ports, respectively. In this work, we refute this presumption by demonstrating that an unprivileged malicious application running on the client (but practically off-path), when combined with a remote off-path adversary, can enable powerful network attacks against such connections. We show how such a local--remote collaboration between the malicious application and a remote adversary allows inference of sensitive connection state, including TCP sequence numbers and DNS stub-resolver UDP source ports. Our attacks exploit standard socket API calls such as bind(), protocol mechanisms such as IP options, and operating system features such as cBPF and procfs to infer the TCP initial sequence number (ISN) and the UDP source port in use by the connection of interest. Specifically, we take advantage of certain properties of the ISN generation algorithm as implemented in major operating systems. We demonstrate TCP connection hijacking in Linux, Android, Windows, macOS and iOS, and DNS cache poisoning against Windows, Android and the popular systemd-resolved DNS stub resolver in Linux. We evaluate our techniques across multiple operating systems and realistic deployment settings, including environments behind port-preserving NAT-integrated routers. We disclosed our techniques to Microsoft, Apple, Linux and Google, which led to the release of several patches. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-10 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09345 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T07:37:41.545Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).