Metraipolis › archive › dc_33ae170f315f

HYDRA: Quantifying Botnet Resource Thresholds for Efficient Link-Flooding Attacks on LEO Satellite Networks — arXiv:2609.15693

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15693
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T23:54:08.465Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9612b1b7a090c4768130c02d1d52ec2226d80c80e5996566c9e83eb0e2c64a62
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_33ae170f315f

How to cite

HYDRA: Quantifying Botnet Resource Thresholds for Efficient Link-Flooding Attacks on LEO Satellite Networks — arXiv:2609.15693 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15693 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_33ae170f315f (Metraipolis archive dc_33ae170f315f, sha256 9612b1b7a090c4768130c02d1d52ec2226d80c80e5996566c9e83eb0e2c64a62)
BibTeX
@misc{dc33ae170f315f,
  title = {HYDRA: Quantifying Botnet Resource Thresholds for Efficient Link-Flooding Attacks on LEO Satellite Networks — arXiv:2609.15693},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15693},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_33ae170f315f; sha256 9612b1b7a090c4768130c02d1d52ec2226d80c80e5996566c9e83eb0e2c64a62},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15693. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, such as Starlink and Kuiper, are rapidly emerging as a critical backbone for low-latency global connectivity. As these systems expand, they become more attractive attack targets, necessitating increased resilience and security. Threat actors seek to exploit constellation-specific properties such as predictable motion, time-varying topologies, and reliance on inter-satellite and ground-satellite links. Recent work has shown that link-flooding attacks (LFAs) can exploit these properties to congest strategic network bottlenecks. Yet, prior work does not quantify the resilience of LEO networks to targeted disruption. We present HYDRA, a modeling and optimization framework that formulates LFA variants as botnet minimization problems. HYDRA quantifies network resilience to LFAs by measuring the smallest active subset of bots and the corresponding traffic allocation required to disrupt communication between targeted geographic areas. Under matched stealth constraints, HYDRA achieves the same targeted disruption as ICARUS while using 34% fewer bots and 23% less aggregate attack traffic. HYDRA achieves over 97% success in sustaining continuous attacks as the network topology evolves. Finally, HYDRA evaluates five mitigation strategies, showing how routing diversification, ingress policing, distance-based traffic constraints, source throttling, and botnet attrition reduce attack success and improve network resilience to targeted disruption.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-15 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15693 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T23:20:42.716Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-15?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).