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Scaling Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibrium Computation for Exclusive Resource-Assignment Games — arXiv:2609.13565

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13565
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T23:48:25.508Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
098a0931476664e57567a38fd5a5a50d3e0c0917ef67a3c5e334b95d37cb8dd5
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3373894881ef

How to cite

Scaling Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibrium Computation for Exclusive Resource-Assignment Games — arXiv:2609.13565 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13565 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3373894881ef (Metraipolis archive dc_3373894881ef, sha256 098a0931476664e57567a38fd5a5a50d3e0c0917ef67a3c5e334b95d37cb8dd5)
BibTeX
@misc{dc3373894881ef,
  title = {Scaling Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibrium Computation for Exclusive Resource-Assignment Games — arXiv:2609.13565},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13565},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_3373894881ef; sha256 098a0931476664e57567a38fd5a5a50d3e0c0917ef67a3c5e334b95d37cb8dd5},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13565. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The chance-constrained correlated equilibrium concept provides a robust coordination technique for self-interested agents whose costs are uncertain to a central coordinator, but the number of joint actions considered in its computation grows exponentially with the number of agents. We propose an exact-one resource-assignment restriction for games in which agents compete for shared resources and simultaneous use of a resource is undesirable or unsafe. The restriction allows each resource to be assigned to exactly one agent, reducing the number of joint actions considered from O(2^(nr)) to O(n^r) for n agents and r resources. The resulting problem is solved over the restricted joint action set while retaining all incentive constraints associated with unilateral deviations. We show that the feasible set of the restricted problem is exactly the convex hull of the chance-constrained pure Nash equilibria contained in the exact-one assignment set, yielding a necessary and sufficient condition for nonemptiness. We further derive a sufficient condition under which all chance-constrained pure Nash equilibria of the unrestricted game are retained by the restriction. Numerical experiments in a vertiport departure-corridor coordination scenario demonstrate a 99.81% reduction in median computation time relative to the unrestricted formulation while achieving equivalent coordination performance.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-15 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13565 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T23:17:52.823Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-15?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).