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Coordinated Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks for Voter--Ballot Linking: A Case Study of the Brazilian E-Polling System — arXiv:2609.32988

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32988
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T22:13:44.745Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
42477e708a7b40a4a24aa0ce1feb3f051ea1c2b2a06c619d85f7961c13705635
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_32e6d0f0ffe2

How to cite

Coordinated Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks for Voter--Ballot Linking: A Case Study of the Brazilian E-Polling System — arXiv:2609.32988 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32988 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_32e6d0f0ffe2 (Metraipolis archive dc_32e6d0f0ffe2, sha256 42477e708a7b40a4a24aa0ce1feb3f051ea1c2b2a06c619d85f7961c13705635)
BibTeX
@misc{dc32e6d0f0ffe2,
  title = {Coordinated Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks for Voter--Ballot Linking: A Case Study of the Brazilian E-Polling System — arXiv:2609.32988},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32988},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_32e6d0f0ffe2; sha256 42477e708a7b40a4a24aa0ce1feb3f051ea1c2b2a06c619d85f7961c13705635},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32988. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In this work, we show how two adversaries (Eve and Mallory) can coordinate an electromagnetic side-channel attack to recon- struct the vote displayed on an e-voting machine (EVM) and link it to a specific voter (Alice). Assuming that Eve has access to a place adjacent to the e-polling room (e.g., restroom, unsupervised room), she performs vote reconstruction by intercepting un- intended electromagnetic emanations associated with the video signal. Meanwhile, Mallory observes when Alice is voting and reports this information to Eve over the Internet. To validate the most critical stage of the attack, we conduct a software-defined radio experiment using the official Brazilian e-voting interface and demonstrate through-wall vote reconstruction. Although conventional monitors are employed rather than official EVMs, our findings provide insights into information forensics and support security recommendations for government authorities responsible for e-voting systems.

Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in cs.CY).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY); Signal Processing (eess.SP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32988 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T21:55:04.262Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CY/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).