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Protocol Integration of Physical Layer Deception into EAP-TEAP Wi-Fi Authentication — arXiv:2610.01580

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01580
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T15:25:17.703Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
61d0b84f54c4f6b148f7d29a4e440a5fa9a395a82fabd53dfe362adfc9a16c12
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_327c7e786d09

How to cite

Protocol Integration of Physical Layer Deception into EAP-TEAP Wi-Fi Authentication — arXiv:2610.01580 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01580 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_327c7e786d09 (Metraipolis archive dc_327c7e786d09, sha256 61d0b84f54c4f6b148f7d29a4e440a5fa9a395a82fabd53dfe362adfc9a16c12)
BibTeX
@misc{dc327c7e786d09,
  title = {Protocol Integration of Physical Layer Deception into EAP-TEAP Wi-Fi Authentication — arXiv:2610.01580},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01580},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_327c7e786d09; sha256 61d0b84f54c4f6b148f7d29a4e440a5fa9a395a82fabd53dfe362adfc9a16c12},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01580. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Credential-based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication cannot distinguish a legitimate credential holder from an adversary using compromised credentials. Physical Layer Deception (PLD) complements credential-based authentication by exposing a deceptive primary object over a primary transport while a separate recovery object travels with differentiated reliability over a secondary channel. Existing PLD studies remain, to our knowledge, at the physical/link-model level; using PLD's activation/deactivation mechanism as an authentication gate creates an authentication-specific design requirement, since an all-inactive attempt would exercise no recovery path. We present a batched PLD-based re-verification step for Enterprise Wi-Fi's TEAP/RADIUS/IEEE 802.11 authentication chain, implemented end to end across the server, access point, and device in the open-source hostap 2.12 codebase. Each attempt carries three rounds, at least one active, with no dedicated activation flag. Across four campaigns totaling 1593 attempts, the prototype evaluates batched recovery behavior, rejects the implemented naive credential-bearing attacker in all 30 attempts, measures successful-path latency, and evaluates the security-reliability trade-off for one, two, and three active rounds under two modeled recovery regimes. The evaluation exercises the protocol and software-MAC behavior directly and analyzes informed and retry-seeking attackers under the software recovery model.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in cs.NI).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01580 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T15:12:20.022Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.NI/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).