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FirstSwap: Pre-Consensus Trade Approvals for Decentralized Market Design — arXiv:2611.10254

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10254
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-10T18:45:40.636Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
370a72ab85432b4a5d741b054ca207fed128db27dacb24393cdb3e60a88cc261
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_326eb40dd3d6

How to cite

FirstSwap: Pre-Consensus Trade Approvals for Decentralized Market Design — arXiv:2611.10254 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10254 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_326eb40dd3d6 (Metraipolis archive dc_326eb40dd3d6, sha256 370a72ab85432b4a5d741b054ca207fed128db27dacb24393cdb3e60a88cc261)
BibTeX
@misc{dc326eb40dd3d6,
  title = {FirstSwap: Pre-Consensus Trade Approvals for Decentralized Market Design — arXiv:2611.10254},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10254},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_326eb40dd3d6; sha256 370a72ab85432b4a5d741b054ca207fed128db27dacb24393cdb3e60a88cc261},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10254. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Decentralized exchanges typically give traders no execution guarantee until a block is finalized. In the meantime, external prices move, traders strategically delay submission, and block producers can influence inclusion and ordering. We introduce FirstSwap, a DEX built on a constant-function market maker pricing curve that gives traders an early pre-approval before consensus, guaranteeing inclusion and execution within their submitted price limit, with final ordering determined by limit prices rather than by a block producer. We demonstrate the benefits of trade pre-approvals in an economic model combining auction theory with CEX-DEX arbitrage. When the CEX price changes gradually, FirstSwap rewards earlier traders with better prices, discouraging strategic delay and yielding higher social welfare and gains to AMM liquidity providers than a batch auction. When the CEX price jumps abruptly, FirstSwap yields higher welfare and smaller AMM losses than fair ordering. The central challenge is delivering fast trade pre-approvals without consensus. We introduce a decentralized, scaled admissibility protocol under which each validator reserves only a fraction of the available liquidity at every price. A trader obtains approval in a single round of messages with a quorum of validators. Somewhat surprisingly, despite Byzantine validators who may approve trades arbitrarily, we show that all quorum-certified trades are jointly admissible and execute within their limits. Our protocol extends naturally to a setting where buy and sell orders can be pre-approved against each other before a block is finalized.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.DC, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10254 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-10T18:38:07.438Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.DC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).