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Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks — arXiv:2609.04879

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-16T23:12:46.401Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: b607e462603359152b80878aa94b7f8afd21bc802c9e1a5c06f400c25a9a00d4
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_31fcbf7cedf2

How to cite

Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks — arXiv:2609.04879 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_31fcbf7cedf2 (Metraipolis archive dc_31fcbf7cedf2, sha256 b607e462603359152b80878aa94b7f8afd21bc802c9e1a5c06f400c25a9a00d4)

BibTeX

@misc{dc31fcbf7cedf2,
  title = {Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks — arXiv:2609.04879},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_31fcbf7cedf2; sha256 b607e462603359152b80878aa94b7f8afd21bc802c9e1a5c06f400c25a9a00d4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper studies physical-layer authentication (PLA) in the near-field regime under impersonation attacks. Unlike the far-field case, where the steering vector depends only on the angle of arrival (AoA), in the near field it depends on both angle and distance. We analyze the attack by minimizing the mean-square error (MSE) between the signal received from a legitimate transmitter Alice and the signal generated by an active attacker Eve. For a single-antenna Eve, we derive the optimal scalar precoder and show that, for an inter-element spacing no larger than half a wavelength and under the standard second-order Fresnel approximation, perfect impersonation is possible only if Eve has the same angle and the same distance from Bob as Alice. We then extend the analysis to a multi-antenna Eve and derive the optimal precoding vector. In this case, perfect impersonation is possible only if Alice steering vector belongs to the subspace spanned by Eve steering vectors. Simulation results show that, in the near field, a distance difference is sufficient to prevent a successful impersonation attack even when Alice and Eve have the same AoA, and confirm the analytical results.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-07 in math.OC).
Categorie arXiv: Information Theory (cs.IT) ; Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T22:51:59.433Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).