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Asymptotically Optimal Public Project Redistribution without Bounded Precision: A Complex-Analytic Proof — arXiv:2610.10995
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- arXiv (en)
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10995
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T06:18:10.963Z
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Asymptotically Optimal Public Project Redistribution without Bounded Precision: A Complex-Analytic Proof — arXiv:2610.10995 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10995 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_313f06136f8e (Metraipolis archive dc_313f06136f8e, sha256 44a9fa7d20cc3cfe114263c7712a3975ebd08dc31ed8707ea53a594611466b34)
BibTeX
@misc{dc313f06136f8e,
title = {Asymptotically Optimal Public Project Redistribution without Bounded Precision: A Complex-Analytic Proof — arXiv:2610.10995},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10995},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_313f06136f8e; sha256 44a9fa7d20cc3cfe114263c7712a3975ebd08dc31ed8707ea53a594611466b34},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10995. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study worst-case VCG redistribution mechanism design for the public project problem, where n agents decide whether to build a non-excludable public project and the designer chooses a Groves term that returns as much of the VCG payment as possible without running a deficit. The objective is the worst-case efficiency ratio, the worst-case ratio between the agents' total utility and the first-best total utility. Prior work showed that this ratio can approach 1 as n grows only under a bounded precision assumption, that all types are rational numbers with a common bounded denominator. The assumption is stronger than it looks: it confines the difficult profiles to those in which all but a bounded number of agents report zero, and an agent who reports zero knows the total exactly. Without it, the best known guarantee tends to 1/2. We remove the assumption. We construct a deterministic, anonymous, strategy-proof, and non-deficit mechanism for arbitrary real types in [0,1] whose worst-case efficiency ratio is 1-O(1/log log n). The construction estimates the shortfall of the reported total below the project cost by filling in each agent's missing report with a resampled one, then estimates the error of that estimate, then the error of the error, and so on. After m rounds the aggregate error is at most 1/Hm mean reports, where Hm is the mth harmonic number. The proof of this bound is the heart of the paper and, unusually for a result about payments, uses complex analysis: a trigonometric representation of the shortfall function together with the Poisson-Jensen inequality for bounded analytic functions in the upper half plane. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10995 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T05:49:00.699Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).