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Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus Redistribution — arXiv:2609.03474

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03474
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-17T02:00:20.962Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: be85fda90d17e747f6ea262619c12d666155d0d789e78e19fb5841ce713ef02a
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2fecb36ba2d3

How to cite

Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus Redistribution — arXiv:2609.03474 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03474 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2fecb36ba2d3 (Metraipolis archive dc_2fecb36ba2d3, sha256 be85fda90d17e747f6ea262619c12d666155d0d789e78e19fb5841ce713ef02a)

BibTeX

@misc{dc2fecb36ba2d3,
  title = {Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus Redistribution — arXiv:2609.03474},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03474},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2fecb36ba2d3; sha256 be85fda90d17e747f6ea262619c12d666155d0d789e78e19fb5841ce713ef02a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03474. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Miner extractable value (MEV) in automated market makers allows block builders to profit from transaction ordering and injected trades, imposing costs on users and contributing to builder centralization. We introduce Otter (Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution), a two-asset batch AMM that achieves provable MEV resilience when the consensus layer provides censorship resilience and block space is uncongested. Otter makes truthful behavior a dominant strategy for both users and builders. Consequently, a builder cannot profit from strategic deviations, including reordering bids or injecting sybil bids, even when the builder is itself a trader with intrinsic value. Moreover, we show that Otter maximizes social welfare, in a strong sense, within a natural class of mechanisms satisfying the desired game-theoretic properties. To achieve these guarantees, we introduce a new paradigm called surplus redistribution, which provably prevents residual surplus from being captured as MEV by redirecting it to the broader community. Specifically, the pool's output tokens need not be distributed entirely among users in the current batch. Instead, residual surplus may be transferred to a smart contract governed by the decentralized community. The accumulated surplus can be used to benefit community members --- for example, by subsidizing transaction fees, rewarding liquidity providers, or returning assets to the pool. Our approach relies on the underlying consensus layer to provide censorship resilience. We motivate its necessity through an impossibility result showing that the desired game-theoretic guarantees become unattainable when the builder is additionally allowed to censor transactions. Thus, our results also provide a mathematically formal demonstration of how consensus-level security guarantees can fundamentally expand what is achievable at the application layer.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03474 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T01:13:00.911Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).