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HideOut - User Protection Against Localization with Throughput Guarantees in Mobile Networks — arXiv:2611.00088

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T11:17:23.257Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b25ba9b77278611ae28ab4c4bfc0768f69f51c226fa89353336ea22fff4845fe
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2f3fd3bf7266

How to cite

HideOut - User Protection Against Localization with Throughput Guarantees in Mobile Networks — arXiv:2611.00088 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2f3fd3bf7266 (Metraipolis archive dc_2f3fd3bf7266, sha256 b25ba9b77278611ae28ab4c4bfc0768f69f51c226fa89353336ea22fff4845fe)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2f3fd3bf7266,
  title = {HideOut - User Protection Against Localization with Throughput Guarantees in Mobile Networks — arXiv:2611.00088},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2f3fd3bf7266; sha256 b25ba9b77278611ae28ab4c4bfc0768f69f51c226fa89353336ea22fff4845fe},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Channel state information (CSI) in cellular networks is primarily used to maintain quality of service (QoS), yet it leaks privacy-sensitive information, in particular the user equipment's (UE) location. CSI is reported in plaintext on a publicly available schedule; thus, capturing it on the air and using a well trained AI model to localize the UE is straightforward. This simplicity in the attack execution makes it a serious privacy vulnerability. Using conventional privacy enhancing techniques, such as additive perturbation from differential privacy, to protect location data can potentially degrade the downlink communication quality. We present HideOut, a client-side defense mechanism that preserves the user's location from neural-based localization methods, while maintaining their downlink Spectral Efficiency (SE). Unlike generic adversarial attacks, HideOut treats downlink SE as a strict constraint in an optimization setting. Under maximum ratio transmission (MRT) beamforming, we show that a user-selected SE loss budget can be converted into an angular rate-feasible constraint on the reported channel vector. HideOut then performs gradient-based localization obfuscation while projecting each update onto this rate-feasible set. We evaluate HideOut against four CSI-based localization architectures under both white-box and black-box assumptions. Across models, HideOut increases localization ambiguity (error) from approximately $1--2$ m to $72--85$ m while keeping downlink SE loss within a $1\%$ budget. These results show that CSI-based localization can be substantially degraded at negligible communication quality loss when adversarial perturbations are made aware of the wireless link.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Information Theory (cs.IT) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T11:02:07.242Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).