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What preferences can - and cannot - predict in multi-agent online learning — arXiv:2608.13810

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13810
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T02:28:13.219Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
76971b2171db1c000ae4aaf93b09fc37eb7ef40dd962fc63c098f0d64cb73a7f
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2f06f43fc6e4

How to cite

What preferences can - and cannot - predict in multi-agent online learning — arXiv:2608.13810 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13810 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2f06f43fc6e4 (Metraipolis archive dc_2f06f43fc6e4, sha256 76971b2171db1c000ae4aaf93b09fc37eb7ef40dd962fc63c098f0d64cb73a7f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2f06f43fc6e4,
  title = {What preferences can - and cannot - predict in multi-agent online learning — arXiv:2608.13810},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13810},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2f06f43fc6e4; sha256 76971b2171db1c000ae4aaf93b09fc37eb7ef40dd962fc63c098f0d64cb73a7f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13810. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL). In one direction, we show that the skeleton of every dynamically stable set (i.e. the set of pure profiles it contains) must also be preferentially stable, that is, it must be closed under profitable deviations. We then ask the converse question: when do preferences determine the long-run behavior of the players' learning dynamics? We begin by showing that preferences characterize asymptotic stability in the case of subgames -- i.e. subsets of pure profiles obtained by restricting players' action sets. Beyond this case however, the equivalence between dynamic and preferential stability collapses: concretely, we construct a three-player game with a preferentially stable set whose span is dynamically unstable, showing in this way that preferences do not suffice as a criterion of dynamic stability. We then bridge this gap via the notion of resilience under aggregate deviations, an easy-to-check payoff-based condition that guarantees asymptotic stability of arbitrary spans of pure strategies.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-17 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13810 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T02:21:49.070Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).