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Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness and Pareto Optimality — arXiv:2608.08966

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08966
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T08:55:46.890Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
bf45c9ed4d9d3c7a9639c14148dfdb550cb73715ba86675f693794fde436806d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cf71a077d57

How to cite

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness and Pareto Optimality — arXiv:2608.08966 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08966 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cf71a077d57 (Metraipolis archive dc_2cf71a077d57, sha256 bf45c9ed4d9d3c7a9639c14148dfdb550cb73715ba86675f693794fde436806d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2cf71a077d57,
  title = {Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness and Pareto Optimality — arXiv:2608.08966},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08966},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cf71a077d57; sha256 bf45c9ed4d9d3c7a9639c14148dfdb550cb73715ba86675f693794fde436806d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08966. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We consider fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with non-negative and additive valuations. The goal is to construct a lottery over deterministic allocations whose induced fractional allocation is envy-free, while every realised allocation is envy-free up to one item and Pareto optimal. We show that this is always possible for two agents. We then prove a stronger result that there always exists a lottery over deterministic allocations whose induced fractional allocation is envy-free, while every realised allocation is envy-free up each one item (EFX) and Pareto optimal. For non-negative integral additive valuations, such a lottery can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time. We also prove that for three agents and four items, there may be no ex-ante envy-free lottery that can be supported on allocations that are simultaneously EFX and Pareto optimal.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-11 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08966 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T08:52:22.686Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).