Metraipolis › archive › dc_2ceff22ab73d

Credibility in school choice — arXiv:2608.29597

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29597
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-17T10:42:01.052Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: f6b3a6a10620c56073c9c3d27cad7a868979835279dccfc36ee8d156132644d3
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2ceff22ab73d

How to cite

Credibility in school choice — arXiv:2608.29597 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29597 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2ceff22ab73d (Metraipolis archive dc_2ceff22ab73d, sha256 f6b3a6a10620c56073c9c3d27cad7a868979835279dccfc36ee8d156132644d3)

BibTeX

@misc{dc2ceff22ab73d,
  title = {Credibility in school choice — arXiv:2608.29597},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29597},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2ceff22ab73d; sha256 f6b3a6a10620c56073c9c3d27cad7a868979835279dccfc36ee8d156132644d3},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29597. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In centralized school choice, a designer who announces a mechanism may deviate from it to favor some students without being detected. A mechanism is credible if it admits no such deviation. We study this credibility problem when students do not know others' reports and may observe only part of the assignment. Credibility is demanding: among common school choice mechanisms, only deferred acceptance is credible, and only when students observe enough of the assignment. We therefore rank mechanisms by their credibility. Deferred acceptance is more credible than any other stable mechanism and strictly more credible than the Boston mechanism, regardless of how much of the assignment students observe. Its ranking relative to top trading cycles and efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance depends on disclosure: deferred acceptance is strictly more credible when students observe the entire assignment, whereas the ranking reverses when students observe only their own assignment.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29597 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T10:29:25.582Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).