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The Capacity Cost of Informational Screening — arXiv:2609.39077
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39077
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T16:04:18.594Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
7cab6c7b6625bbddd012ccd987b905158e7ae5c3d82623ec1a3c649bad638beb- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
The Capacity Cost of Informational Screening — arXiv:2609.39077 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39077 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cc29593e0bd (Metraipolis archive dc_2cc29593e0bd, sha256 7cab6c7b6625bbddd012ccd987b905158e7ae5c3d82623ec1a3c649bad638beb)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2cc29593e0bd,
title = {The Capacity Cost of Informational Screening — arXiv:2609.39077},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39077},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cc29593e0bd; sha256 7cab6c7b6625bbddd012ccd987b905158e7ae5c3d82623ec1a3c649bad638beb},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39077. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
An advisor knows who would benefit from using a resource but cannot assign its use. Individuals have private assessments and may ignore advice. We study how their choices can respect a fixed usage limit. In our model, whenever coordination is possible, eliciting private assessments makes some harmful use unavoidable. Policies that maximize welfare, or even minimize harm, also forgo beneficial uses that direct assignment would permit. In those environments, observing assessments instead allows advice to achieve as much beneficial use as direct assignment, without harmful use. The loss therefore reflects the incentive cost of eliciting private beliefs while leaving use voluntary. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-01 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39077 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T15:37:43.268Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-10-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).