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Human Driver Temperament and the Safety Impact of a C-V2X Denial-of-Service Flooding Attack in Mixed-Autonomy Traffic — arXiv:2609.21206
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21206
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-10T01:44:07.305Z
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Human Driver Temperament and the Safety Impact of a C-V2X Denial-of-Service Flooding Attack in Mixed-Autonomy Traffic — arXiv:2609.21206 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21206 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cb3f64ce3b3 (Metraipolis archive dc_2cb3f64ce3b3, sha256 d1c881ab612d30473b8e44b19f044cf91d1bf2986e8e303d0fba6b0c71198657)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2cb3f64ce3b3,
title = {Human Driver Temperament and the Safety Impact of a C-V2X Denial-of-Service Flooding Attack in Mixed-Autonomy Traffic — arXiv:2609.21206},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21206},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2cb3f64ce3b3; sha256 d1c881ab612d30473b8e44b19f044cf91d1bf2986e8e303d0fba6b0c71198657},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21206. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Cooperative and connected automated vehicles (CAVs) rely on Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages to cross signalized intersections; a denial-of-service (DoS) flood that blocks SPaT forces CAVs into a fail-safe mode. Because human-driven vehicles share the intersection, the safety consequence depends not only on the attack and the CAV fail-safe policy, but on how the surrounding human drivers behave. We investigate this human-factors dimension with a coupled OMNeT++/INET (5G NR-V2X) and SUMO microsimulation of a signalized corridor, sweeping CAV market penetration (10-90%), four calibrated driver temperaments (cautious to aggressive) and two standards-based fail-safe policies, a minimal-risk maneuver (MRM) and an adaptive cruise control (ACC) keep-driving fallback, with each attack arm differenced against its policy-matched no-attack baseline. Temperament's effect on the attack is specific and modest rather than a blanket amplification. Aggressive surroundings worsen one metric, the hard-braking a keep-driving fail-safe forces on nearby drivers (p = 0.03), rising from near zero to +8 episodes/1000 veh-s. They appear to dampen rear-end conflicts, but only because the flood clears the queues aggressive drivers build, so the gain is in flow, not safety. On the attack's primary signatures, CAV red-light running and crossing conflicts, temperament has no detectable effect. It instead dominates baseline risk, producing a 13- to 18-fold cautious-to-aggressive gradient far larger than the attack itself, which acts through a channel already congested by CAV adoption. Human driver populations determine how dangerous the intersection is but do not systematically amplify this attack, so fail-safe design cannot assume a cautious test population bounds the risk. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-21 in cs.HC). Categorie arXiv: Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21206 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-10T01:13:57.199Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.HC/2026-09-21?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).