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Approximate Dynamic Programming for Link Reconfiguration to Reduce Malicious Input Controllability in Consensus Networks — arXiv:2610.40919

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40919
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-02T08:13:47.359Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d1cf9e002ca56e051f84f36e07aa9d25dc5c77b206d25149c3b91515e54cf463
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2bdc39dd38ed

How to cite

Approximate Dynamic Programming for Link Reconfiguration to Reduce Malicious Input Controllability in Consensus Networks — arXiv:2610.40919 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40919 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2bdc39dd38ed (Metraipolis archive dc_2bdc39dd38ed, sha256 d1cf9e002ca56e051f84f36e07aa9d25dc5c77b206d25149c3b91515e54cf463)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2bdc39dd38ed,
  title = {Approximate Dynamic Programming for Link Reconfiguration to Reduce Malicious Input Controllability in Consensus Networks — arXiv:2610.40919},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40919},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2bdc39dd38ed; sha256 d1cf9e002ca56e051f84f36e07aa9d25dc5c77b206d25149c3b91515e54cf463},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40919. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Communication links influence how strongly a malicious input at one sensor affects a consensus network. We study how a defender can reduce this influence by selecting one additional link after observing the currently attacked sensor. The attacked sensor changes over time, and vulnerability is measured by the trace of a finite-horizon controllability Gramian. A prescribed local epsilon-greedy attacker response rule defines a discounted Markov decision process for the defender. Exact dynamic programming (DP) provides an optimal policy using the full Gramian payoff matrix and attacker transition model. We then introduce approximate dynamic programming (ADP) that learns from sampled attacker transitions and empirical Gramian costs estimated from measured impulse responses. Under conditionally unbiased costs and standard sampling and learning-rate conditions, the learned action-value table converges to the exact DP solution. The analysis uses Bellman contraction and bounds the effect of persistent Gramian estimation bias, establishing when measured responses recover optimal defender decisions without constructing the full payoff matrix. In simulations on 20- and 100-node graphs, empirical ADP rollout costs are within 0.23% and 1.76%, respectively, of exact DP. In a two-dimensional intruder tracking example, both policies reduce network-wide root-mean-square tracking error spread by approximately 25% relative to an unmitigated attack.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv eess.SY, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40919 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-02T07:52:46.298Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/eess.SY/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).