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When appearance and motion disagree: evaluating class--motion consistency against disguised uncrewed surface vessels — arXiv:2611.00367

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00367
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-03T11:17:01.695Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: f02cda9fb3bd564c3c3aa23f592922db84d48c4fa81abbf61990b83f795ae515
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_29fff3edeffd

How to cite

When appearance and motion disagree: evaluating class--motion consistency against disguised uncrewed surface vessels — arXiv:2611.00367 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00367 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_29fff3edeffd (Metraipolis archive dc_29fff3edeffd, sha256 f02cda9fb3bd564c3c3aa23f592922db84d48c4fa81abbf61990b83f795ae515)

BibTeX

@misc{dc29fff3edeffd,
  title = {When appearance and motion disagree: evaluating class--motion consistency against disguised uncrewed surface vessels — arXiv:2611.00367},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00367},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_29fff3edeffd; sha256 f02cda9fb3bd564c3c3aa23f592922db84d48c4fa81abbf61990b83f795ae515},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00367. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Defense systems for maritime assets must distinguish approaching benign craft from uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) with sufficient warning to act. Shore cameras using computer vision can separate hostile vessels from benign traffic, but these systems may be attacked using an adversarial hull patch or physical disguise. We evaluate adversarial hull patches and find they suppress detection in up to 29% of attempts but never cause misclassification as benign. Physical disguise, however, can bypass both a camera check and a radar presence check. To evaluate defenses, we develop a hybrid replay protocol from automatic identification system (AIS) tracks that combines recorded benign motion with direct or off-axis attack run-ins. We find that for recreational-labeled vessels attacking via direct run-in within 4 nautical miles, an asset-relative closing-rate check flags 94-95% at 15-20 knots, compared with 12% for a track-only speed check. The checks are complementary on off-axis approaches, constraining the attacker to remain below both thresholds and extending the time required to reach the asset. Flagging on either check has a 4.9% held-out false-alarm rate overall and 12.3% on recreational traffic. The replay-based evaluation protocol supports comparative test and evaluation of defense methods.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Robotics (cs.RO).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00367 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T11:02:07.177Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).