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Litter-Masked Block z-Channel: Designing Cover Distributions Against Public-Design Observers — arXiv:2609.31767

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31767
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T23:46:52.110Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
217a71e837fcebd4a5324ca8fe56360fa7cb2c99e2a97914887f766a89158982
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2854da84fbb5

How to cite

Litter-Masked Block z-Channel: Designing Cover Distributions Against Public-Design Observers — arXiv:2609.31767 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31767 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2854da84fbb5 (Metraipolis archive dc_2854da84fbb5, sha256 217a71e837fcebd4a5324ca8fe56360fa7cb2c99e2a97914887f766a89158982)
BibTeX
@misc{dc2854da84fbb5,
  title = {Litter-Masked Block z-Channel: Designing Cover Distributions Against Public-Design Observers — arXiv:2609.31767},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31767},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_2854da84fbb5; sha256 217a71e837fcebd4a5324ca8fe56360fa7cb2c99e2a97914887f766a89158982},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31767. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Networking defenses against traffic analysis fill idle slots with cover traffic, yet the physical layer carrying it still hands upper layers the erasure-only model of a silent-idle link, leaving the cover content unexploited. We shape that content: the idle-slot waveform is drawn from the codebook complement under a design distribution, the \emph{litter distribution}, chosen to defeat a public-design passive observer while the upper layer keeps its block z-channel model. The maximum a posteriori (MAP) receiver reduces to a single threshold on the log-likelihood ratio between the best codeword and the prior-weighted litter aggregate; its errors are silent corruptions the upper layer cannot detect and erasures that retransmission absorbs. Receiver design is thus one-dimensional, minimizing erasure under a cap on silent corruption, and the joint design a Stackelberg game against a Kullback-Leibler (KL) indistinguishability metric, solved by an alternating convex relaxation and corroborated by an independent reinforcement-learning policy. On a rate-$3/4$ $(16,12)$ parity-check (LDPC) code against an observer who knows her own channel but whose channel the transmitter knows only statistically, shaped litter cuts the observer's Stein detection exponent by $41$ to $48\%$ relative to uniform cover, flat over a $10$~dB span and in the activity rate. Below the point where the legitimate link turns reliable, no cover distribution admits an operating point; at that point shaping costs about one percent of throughput, and nothing measurable $2$~dB above it.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in math.IT).
Categorie arXiv: Information Theory (cs.IT) ; Signal Processing (eess.SP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31767 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T23:26:01.101Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.IT/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).